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I. INTRODUCTION
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) was introduced under the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in order to set an international minimum
standard for the protection of intellectual property.' One of the
goals of the United States in the Uruguay Round was to ensure
that the TRIPS Agreement included a mechanism for the advance-
ment and adjustment of international intellectual property
protection.2 The United States additionally sought broad patent
protection for all patentable subject matter, including plants and
living organisms. 3  The United States biotechnology industry
' Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS - THE LEGAL TEXTS 1-3 (1994) [hereinafter RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C [hereinafter WTO Agreement], reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 6-
19, 365-403; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 6-19,
365-403. See also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 101-103, 108
Stat. 4809 (1994) (regulating international intellectual property). The WIPO and the WTO
have entered into a general agreement regarding how the two organizations shall cooperate.
Agreement between the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade
Organizations (visited Feb. 18, 1998) <http-J/www.wto.org/wto/intellec/17-wipo.htm>.
At least one commentator, with a pro-developing country viewpoint, has challenged the
purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. See VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE
AND KNOWLEDGE 81 (1997) ("The TRIPs agreement of GAIT is not the result of democratic
negotiations between the larger public and commercial interests or between industrialized
countries and the Third World. It is the imposition of values and interests by Western
transnational corporations on the diverse societies and cultures of the world.").
Because the TRIPS Agreement was the product of multilateral negotiations, the TRIPS
Agreement represents a compromise between countries with strongly opposing views
regarding the value of intellectual property for development. Robert M. Sherwood, The
TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 494 (1997).
2 Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age
of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 465, 468 (1994) (citing Mark C.
Damschroder, Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: United States Goals in the
Uruguay Round, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 391 (1988)).
While the developed countries sought expanded protection for intellectual property,
developing countries sought measures that would have weakened the then existing
obligations for protecting intellectual property. J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum
Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO
Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345, 351 (1995).
' J. Benjamin Bai, Comment, Protecting Plant Varieties under TRIPS and NAFTA:
Should Utility Patents be Available for Plants?, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 139, 141 (1997) (citing
GATr Secretariat, Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, pt. 2, art. 33, MTN.GNGNGllW/70 (May 11, 1990)). See also Klaus Bosselmann,
3
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sought two additional concessions during the negotiations of the
TRIPS Agreement. First, the United States biotechnology industry
wanted to secure a minimum term of patent protection of twenty
years from the date of filing.4 Second, the industry wanted to
secure an expansion on the definition of what constitutes patent-
able subject matter.' The developing countries sought, however,
to shorten the term of patent protection, and to narrow the
definition of patentable subject matter by excluding plants and
living organisms from the definition of patentable subject matter.
While the United States successfully lobbied for a minimum term
of patent protection of twenty years from the date of filing,7 the
provision governing the patentability of living organisms and
biological processes, which encompassed micro-organisms, seeds,
plants and animals, proved to be more controversial.8 In order to
obtain the support of developing countries, provisions were added
Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime Concerning Biotechnology and
Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 111, 127 (1996) (stating that the U.S. sought
protection of biological inventions, including pharmaceutical products and processes).
The developed countries were able to obtain safeguards for the protection ofpharmaceutic-
als and agrochemicals, including a pipeline provision that provides pharmaceutical and
agrochemical patents at least five years of exclusive rights in countries that previously did
not grant patents in these areas. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 70(8), (9). See also
Reichman, supra note 2, at 353 (citing the TRIPS Agreement at art. 70(8), (9)).
" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Intellectual Property Provisions:
Hearing on H.R. 4894 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin. of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary and S. 2368 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights,
and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 403 (1994) (statement
of Genentech, Inc.).
'Id.
6 Bosselmann, supra note 3, at 127; Bai, supra note 3, at 141-42 (citing GATT" Secretariat,
Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria,
Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, pt. 2, art. 4(1)(ii), MTN.GNG/NG11/W71 (May 15, 1990)).
For example, Brazil, India and Peru strongly resisted the establishment of a minimum
term of patent protection. Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field
of Patent Law, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS - THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 161, 198 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds.,
1996). See also Vandana Date, Global "Development"and its Environmental Ramifications -
The Interlinking of Ecologically Sustainable Development and Intellectual Property Rights,
27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 631, 655 (1997) ("[D]eveloped and developing nations have
different goals for preservation of biodiversity and protection of [intellectual property
rights].").
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 33.
8 See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property Protections
for Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the Exception for
Agriculture, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83, 114 (1995) (noting the need to make concessions
in these provisions).
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to the TRIPS allowing for preclusion from patentability methods for
the treatment of humans or animals, essentially biological process-
es for the production of plants and animals, and plants and animals
themselves.9 As a final concession, however, all parties agreed to
review these provisions four years after the implementation of the
TRIPS Agreement. ° This review is scheduled to begin in January
1999, and no deadline has been set for completing the review."
The World Trade Organization (WTO) will constitute the forum for
these additional negotiations. 2
This Article explores the present provisions on the patentability
of biotechnology inventions under the TRIPS Agreement and the
divergent positions of developed and developing countries toward
this issue. Specifically, Part I of this Article discusses the relation-
ship between the biotechnology industry and a strong intellectual
property regime. Part II reviews the provisions on the patentabili-
ty of biotechnology subject matter under the TRIPS Agreement.
Part III explores the different viewpoints of developed countries
and developing countries (including less developed countries) with
respect to patent protection of biotechnology. Part IV discusses
potential ways of bridging the gap between the viewpoints of the
developed and developing countries regarding patent protection for
biotechnology. Part V discusses the possible ramifications of
inadequate intellectual property protection on the developing
countries.
'TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27, para. 3. See also Scalise & Nugent, supra note
8, at 115 (describing concessions by supporters to removal of intellectual property protection
for micro-organisms, nonbiological, and microbiological processes for the production of plants
and animals).
It has been suggested that the European Community proposal served as the basis for the
final wording of this provision. Ana Maria Pac6n, What will TRIPs do for Developing
Countries?, in FROM GATT TO TRIPs - THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-REILATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 329, 343 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds.,
1996) (citing van Wijk, GATT and the Legal Protection of Plants in the Third World, 10
BIoTEcINoLOGY & DEv. MONITOR 14 (1992)).
1
oTRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27, para. 3.
1 WTO Implementation Report: Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (visited Feb.
18, 1998), <http://www.ustr.gov/reportstwto/intellectual-property.html>. Article 71 of the
TRIPS Agreement also authorizes the TRIPS Council to "undertake reviews in the light of
any relevant new developments which might warrant modification or amendment of the
Agreement." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 71, para. 1. It is likely, however, that this
review will not occur at its scheduled time.
12 Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 413 (1996).
19981
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II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
AND A STRONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
In developed countries, the exclusive rights provided by patent
protection 13 act "as an incentive to inventors to risk the often
enormous costs of invention in terms of time, research and
development."" It has been suggested that the patent system
stimulates investment by reducing the risk of innovation. 5
Because the patent system vests in an inventor this exclusive right,
the patent holder or its licensees may be able to obtain an en-
hanced return in the subject invention. 6 Any exclusive right,
"s It has been argued that the intellectual property systems of developed countries rest
on three basic premises. These premises are as follows:
1. that "development," defined at least in part as including economic growth,
is a desirable goal for all modern societies;
2. that technological innovation contributes in some beneficial way to
economic growth; and,
3. that the existence of a legal framework that protects inventions from theft
or copying by others stimulates technological innovation.
David Silverstein, Intellectual Property Rights, Trading Patterns and Practices, Wealth
Distribution, Development and Standards of Living: A North-South Perspective on Patent Law
Harmonization, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE SEARCH FOR
A BALANCED SYSTEM 155, 158 (George R. Stewart et al. eds., 1994).
14 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). See also 35 U.S.C. § 271
(1994 & Supp. II 1996) (describing conditions upon which an inventor may base an
infringement action).
15 Sherwood, supra note 1, at 492. See also Kevin W. McCabe, Note, Implications of the
CellPro Determination on Inventions Made with FederalAssistance: Will the Government Ever
Exercise Its March-In Right?, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 645, 648 (1998) ("The market exclusivity
provided by patent protection affords patent owners the opportunity to realize a return on
their investment."). However, this concept has been challenged by some commentators. See,
e.g., SHIVA, supra note 1, at 13 ("There is virtually no evidence that patents actually
stimulate invention.").
16 PHILIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS § 336 (1997). See also David
R. Marsh, The Preclusive Effect of Foreign Country Patent Judgements in the United States,
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 469, 471 (1995) (describing the ability of patentees to recoup
research and development costs by charging "a price reflective of their ability to exclude
others from the market"); Evan Ackiron, Patents for Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT
Case, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 167, 173 (1991) (noting that Burroughs Welcome purportedly
spent $80 million developing the drug AZT but earned an estimated $25 million to $100
million in net profits from the drug in 1989 when sales reached $220 million); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024-25 (1989) (noting that inventions will not be made in the absence
6
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however, is available only for a limited time.17
In developed countries, it has been suggested that enhanced
intellectual property protection stimulates economic growth and
enhances social welfare. 8 Furthermore, it has been argued that
the benefits that enhanced intellectual property protection provide
are not limited to developed countries. 9
B. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
The biotechnology industry ° in particular depends on the
safeguards provided by the patent laws because of the high costs of
research, development, and commercialization associated with
biotechnology inventions.2' It has been suggested that high-tech
of patent protection "because inventions once made are easily appropriated by competitors
of the original inventor who have not shared in the costs of the invention"). Alternatively,
it has been argued that patent protection stimulates investment "because it offers assurance
that others cannot immediately copy a successful product or use a successful process."
Sherwood, supra note 1, at 500.
" The present term of a patent is twenty years from the date of filing. TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 1, art. 33; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). In other words, society
balances two competing social objectives: "the need to encourage technical innovation and
the need to disperse the benefits of that innovation throughout society." David Hurlbut,
Fixing the Biodiversity Convention: Toward a Special Protocol for Related Intellectual
Property, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 379, 383 (1994), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 32 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris E. Long eds., 1996).
18 Sherwood, supra note 1, at 492.
19 Sherwood, supra note 1, at 493 ("[Tjhe same general observations probably hold true
for developing countries.").
' In this Article, the phrase "biotechnology industry" is used broadly to encompass
industries that utilize methods, processes, or compositions of matter employing biological
molecules, biological systems, or living organisms.
The biotechnology industry, in the United States alone, comprised over 1000 small to
medium companies in 1994, employed over 184,000 persons in 1992, and had revenues in
excess of $52 billion in 1991. Pharmaceuticals, 4 No. 7 MEx. TRADE & L. REp. 24 (July
1994). See also Hearings on Technical Innovations in Health Care Before the House Joint
Econ. Comm., 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of Roger C. Herdman, director, Office of
Technology Assessment), available in LEXIS, Legis library, CNGTST file (estimating that
by 1995, 1300 biotechnology firms existed in the United States); Gail Dutton, Biotech: Risky
Business, 84 MGMT. REV. Jan. 1995 at 36 (stating that 1,025 of the firms in the biotechnology
industry were formed after 1980).
21 See S. REP. NO. 96-480, at 19 (1979) ("It has been estimated by many experts that the
cost of taking a new invention from basic research through development and commercializa-
tion costs 10 times as much as did the basic research itself."); WENDY H. SCHACHT,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE
BAYH-DOLE ACT: PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY, 4 (1994)
7
McCabe: The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement: Div
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1998
48 J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 6:41
industries, such as the biotechnology industry, could not exist
without a strong and effective patent law system.22
Billions of dollars are invested in developing new medical
technologies," and yet it is estimated that only one in five thou-
sand pharmaceutical compounds24 ever reaches the commercial
market. 25 The costs of bringing a biotechnology product to market
are compounded by the complex hurdles imposed by regulatory
agencies before a new product is approved for sale. 26  Further-
more, biological inventions are particularly susceptible to piracy
because, while they typically require substantial expenditures to
develop, they are often simple to replicate."
The biotechnology industry, as all industries, is regulated by two
fundamental economic theories.28 First, as rational actors biotech-
("Studies have shown that research funding only accounts for approximately 25 percent of
the costs associated with bringing a new product to market."); Biopharmaceuticals Increase
Their Share of the Market, MFG. CHEMIST, Feb. 1997, at 28 (stating that it takes an average
of 12 years and $360 million to bring a biopharmaceutical drug to market); General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Intellectual Property Provisions Before the Joint
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin. and the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights, and Trademarks, Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 295 (1994) [hereinafter
Mossinghoff Statement] (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, president, Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America) (estimating that it takes 10 to 12 years and over
$350 million to bring a single pharmaceutical product to market).
22 Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Ralph Oman, The World Intellectual Property Organization:
A United Nations Success Story, 160 WoRLD AFF. 104, 105 (1997) (stating that according to
a study by the World Bank, "65 percent of modem pharmaceutical products would not have
been developed or introduced in the absence of adequate intellectual property protection").
'2 Elizabeth Corcoran, Patent Medicine, 259 SCI. AM. 128 (1988). See also Robert Pear,
U.S. Will Tighten Health-Lab Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1992 at Al (stating that the
government plans to channel $9 billion to critical public health areas).
' Although these statistics apply to pharmaceutical compounds, biotechnology products
undergo the same rigorous research and development procedures as pharmaceutical
compounds. Biotechnology products therefore would have a similar likelihood of reaching
the commercial market. Kenneth B. Lee, Jr. & Lilly S. Hu, Biotechnology: Past, Present,
Future, 1996 CHEMISTRY & INDUSTRY 334.
25 Mossinghoff Statement, supra note 21. Other commentators have estimated that the
probalifility of a newly synthesized compound reaching the marketplace is less than one in
twelve thousand. See, e.g., Brian H. Vickery, Cost of Research and Patent Considerations,
8 J. ANDROLOGY S-27 (1987) (calculating that the "overall probability of a ... newly
synthesized compound reaching the market place reaches the vanishingly small figure of less
than 1:12,000 (0.008%)").
26 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 96-480, at 19 (1979) ("Additionally, a medical discovery faces
lengthy, expensive regulatory procedures before any new medicine can be marketed.").
'2 William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Technology, 11 J. LEG. MED. 263, 264 (1990).
28 McCabe, supra note 15, at 661-62.
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nology companies will seek to maximize their investment return.29
Second, because investors are risk averse, they would be less
willing to invest in biotechnology if they are not guaranteed
adequate patent protection.3 ° Although the aim of the biotechnol-
ogy industry is to alleviate the world's health problems, "[wie need
to remember that health care, at least in the United States, is part
of our society's free-market economic system,"31 and therefore it
is motivated by profit.
2
The biotechnology company's desire to price its patented products
above competitive levels might seem excessive, but such prices are
often justified as allowing the company that sponsored the research
leading to a product to recover the research and development costs,
not only for that product, but also for its many failed experi-
ments.33 Furthermore, the seemingly excessive prices for biomedi-
cal products often pale in comparison to the costs that untreated
ailments can impose on society.34
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 6 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1992).
'o C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine:
Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 55, 60 n.26 (1987);
POSNER, supra note 29, at 12.
" Michael Montagne, Drug Advertising and Promotion: An Introduction, 22 J. DRUG
ISsUEs 195, 202 (1992). See also Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical
Patents: An Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 302
(1994) ("According to economic theory, companies in the industry will focus their research
and development efforts on finding products that will eventually become profitable.");
Thomas P. Dillon, Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in Biotechnical
Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 628, 639
(1989) (discussing the role of profit-making in healthcare).
32 Montagne, supra note 31, at 202.
' By many estimates, only one in ten thousand compounds ever reaches the commercial
marketplace. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of
developing and marketing a successful biotechnology product). Therefore, the one successful
commercial product needs to provide the biotechnology company with sufficient profits to
allow that company to recover the research and development costs of, not only that product,
but also the remaining 9,999 products that failed to reach the marketplace. Fisch, supra
note 31, at 303.
3 It has been estimated that
[iun 1990 alone, for example, the projected cost of cardiovascular disease and
stroke to the U.S. economy was $95 billion, including the costs of hospital
days, disability days, and $33 billion in medical expenditures, not to mention
the countless potential years of life lost before the age of 65; for acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) including the loss of productivity, the
estimated 1990 cost was $26 billion. In 1989 cancer cost the nation $100
9
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Biotechnology companies rely on the exclusive rights provided by
the patent system because of the astronomical costs of research and
development associated with the biotechnology industry.35
Furthermore, because of the "competitive and imitative" nature of
the biotechnology industry, companies will hesitate to enter into
research and development agreements or technology transfer and
licensing agreements with respect to their biotechnology inventions
unless they are guaranteed exclusive rights.3"
III. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT
The TRIPS Agreement provides that "patents shall be available
... without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of
technology and whether products are imported or locally pro-
duced." 7  The TRIPS Agreement defines patentable subject
matter as any new invention that involves an inventive step and
has a potential industrial application. 8
A Member country may, however, exclude certain subject matter
from patentability. 9 The TRIPS Agreement provides that Mem-
ber countries may exclude inventions from patentability in order to
"protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human,
billion, and Alzheimer's disease cost $80 billion.
P. Roy Vagelos, Are Prescription Drug Prices High?, 252 SCIENCE 1080, 1081(1991) (citations
omitted).
See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (discussing the biotechnology industry).
Paepke, supra note 30, at 60 n.26. See also Ajay K Sharma, The Global Loss of
Biodiversity:A Perspective in the Context of the Controversy Over Intellectual Property Rights,
4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 15 (1995) (noting that pharmaceutical corporations in the
U.S. would be "somewhat hesitant to enter into technology transfer or licensing agreements
in the developing world"). But see Linda R. Judge, Comment, Issues Surrounding the
Patenting of Medical Procedures, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 181, 203
(1997) ("Intellectual property protection tends to eliminate conventional scientific interaction
where information is freely disseminated, and therefore, conflicts with incentives provided
to scientists to achieve advancements in science and medicine.") (citing Aryeh S. Friedman,
Law and the Innovative Process: Preliminary Reflections, 1986 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 7
(1986)).
3 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(1).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27. It has been suggested that international
protection of biotechnology inventions has been substantially weakened in subsequent
agreements. Doane, supra note 2, at 489 (citations omitted).
" TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(2)-(3).
[Vol. 6:41
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animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment."40 Thus, Member countries may exclude an inven-
tion from patentability only if the commercial exploitation of the
invention is not permitted in the Member country and such a
prohibition is necessary in order to protect the interests outlined in
Article 27(2). 41
The TRIPS Agreement also provides that Member countries may
exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the
treatment of humans or animals;
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and
essentially biological processes for the production of
plants or animals other than non-biological and microbi-
ological processes."
These exclusions do "not cover apparatus and products for diagnos-
tic and therapeutic methods, such as 'kits for application in a
diagnostic method.' 4
If a Member country excludes plant varieties from patent
protection, however, it must provide protection for plant varieties
by an effective sui generis system.' The TRIPS Agreement does
not define what is meant by "an effective sui generis system,"
however, most commentators believe that this reference is intended
to refer to a system modeled after the International Convention for
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).45
40 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(2) (emphasis in original). A Member country,
however, cannot exclude such subject matter "merely because the exploitation is prohibited
by their law." Id.
4Id.; Straus, supra note 6, at 182.
42 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(3)(a)-(b).
43 Pac6n, supra note 9, at 339 (citations omitted).
" Article 27(3)(b) provides that "Members shall provide for the protection of plant
varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination
thereof." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(3)(b).
' Bosselmann, supra note 3, at 124 ("Ihe nations of Europe adopted sui generis plant-
variety protection schemes under UPOV rather than patent-based protection schemes."). See
also Bai, supra note 3, at 140 (suggesting that the UPOV is a suitable system of protection
on the international level).
1998]
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The TRIPS Agreement additionally allows developing countries
to postpone the implementation of most of the intellectual stan-
dards provided by the TRIPS Agreement for a period of at least five
years, and up to ten years with respect to technology fields that
were previously excluded from patent protection under their
domestic laws.46
IV. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' CONCERNS OVER PATENT
PROTECTION FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS
Developing countries have expressed several concerns over the
TRIPS Agreement.47 Some of the concerns stem from the different
view that non-Western cultures have toward individual liberty. 41
Other concerns stem from a view that strong intellectual property
protection only serves the developed countries' interests.
A. A STRONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION REGIME ONLY
BENEFITS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
First, developing countries view the strong intellectual property
protection advanced by the developed countries as only benefiting
the industrialized, developed countries that export intellectual
property. 49 Developing countries tend to regard patents as a way
" TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 65(1), (2), (4).47 See SHIVA, supra note 1, at 56 ("If the regimen of rights being demanded by the United
States is implemented, the transfer of funds from poor to rich countries will exacerbate the
Third World crisis 10 times over.") (citation omitted).
4See Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 385 ("Islamic and some African cultures go so far as to
define self-identity not according to individual liberty but according to the individual's
relationship with and contribution to society .... [Uf individual liberty is not the basis for
self identity, then the moral foundations of property must rest somewhere else."); Carlos
Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View
from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989), excerpt reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 42, 43 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds.,
1996) ("[Ihe Least Developed Countries tend to assign a higher weight to 'social' interests
(often loosely defined) than to private interests.").
49 See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING
COuNTRIEs § 25, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/1, U.N. Sales No. 96.II.D.10 (1996) [hereinafter
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/1] (stating that developed countries will reap most of the immediate
benefits of the TRIPS intellectual property treaty and listing ways for them to assist the
developing countries in implementing and benefitting from the system); Silverstein, supra
note 13, at 157 (stating that less developed countries feel that "Western science and
12
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for the developed countries "to maintain their head start in
technology and deny a transfer of technology so that [the develop-
ing countries] can begin their own research and development
industries."50 Developing countries also view the TRIPS Agree-
ment as an impediment to the development of self-sustaining
pharmaceutical industries in the developing countries.5
technological innovation typically favor Western needs."); Braga, supra note 48, at 252-53
("In most Third World countries, a reform of intellectual property laws perceived to favor
foreign capital would be highly controversial."); Otto A. Stamm, GATT Negotiations for the
Protection of New Technologies, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Socy 680,689 (1991) (stating
that the GATT rules for efficient protection of inventions only benefit the industrial countries
that export intellectual property).
It has been estimated that over eighty percent of all unexpired patents in developing
countries are owned by foreign corporations or individuals. Mark Ritchie et al., Intellectual
Property Rights and Biodiversity: The Industrialization of Natural Resources and Traditional
Knowledge, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431,439 (1996). According to another study,
over ninety percent of all unexpired patents in developing countries were owned by foreign
corporations or individuals. Silverstein, supra note 13, at 170 (citing Shoii Matsui, The
Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Some Proposals to Solve Current Problems,
59 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 612, 614 (1977)). Even more troubling from the
developing country's perspective, however, is that over ninety-five percent of foreign owned
patents are not commercialized in these countries. Ritchie et al., supra, at 439 (citing
CHAKARARAvARTmi RAGHAVAN, RECOLONIZATION: GATT, THE URUGUAY RouND & THE THIRD
WORLD 123 (1990)). However, even in the United States only a fraction of patents are ever
commercialized. Ritchie et al., supra, at 439.
' Bosselmann, supra note 3, at 127. See also, SHIVA, supra note 1, at 5 ("Through
patents and genetic engineering, new colonies are being carved out.").
Developing countries want technology transfer mechanisms and believe that technology
is a common asset that should be shared freely. See Date, supra note 6, at 650 (noting that
developed countries consider technology to be a valuable property right and therefore support
efforts to protect it); James 0. Odek, Bio-Piracy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic
Resources, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 141, 150 (1994) (stating that developing countries believe
that genetic resources, as the common heritage of mankind, should be freely available).
However, in the typical technology transfer agreement, the parent company from the
developed country retains control over the technology and the subsidiary established in the
developing country. David M. Haug, The International Transfer of Technology: Lessons that
East Europe Can Learn from the Failed Third World Experience, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 209,
214 (1992).
Developing countries have likened the position of the developed countries on intellectual
property rights to imperialism. Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic,
Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 613, 614-20 (1996).
5 Ritchie et al., supra note 49, at 437.
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B. A STRONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION REGIME IS
INAPPROPRIATE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
An additional concern is that the patenting of technology is
inappropriate to the developing countries' needs and resources and
tends to block the development of indigenous technologies that may
be better suited to the developing countries' needs.52 It has been
suggested, however, that patent protection does not harm most
developing countries because these countries do not have the
industrial potential to compete with the developed countries.53
The intellectual property standard promoted by the developed
countries is premised on the existence of a market-based econo-
my.' In other words, strong "intellectual property protection can
be expected to produce maximum benefits in markets where private
capital and open trade are encouraged."55 Many developing and
less developed countries do not have ready access to private capital
and do not encourage open trade.5" Because many developing
countries do not have market-based economies, it has been argued
that the model proposed by the developed countries is not readily
applicable to developing countries.57
C. A STRONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION REGIME IS A
FINANCIAL BURDEN ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Developing countries have raised concern about the costs
associated with developing and maintaining a sophisticated
52 Silverstein, supra note 13, at 157. See also A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent
System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831, 848 (1987)
(explaining that developing countries may benefit from patent systems because they offer an
incentive for development); Haug, supra note 50, at 224 ("One of the consistent problems that
third world nations have faced in successfully importing technology is that the technology
acquired from developed nations is ill-suited to the third world's needs.").
' See Stamm, supra note 49, at 690 (stating that patent protection "interferes with
national industry only where the industrial potential for copying exists, i.e. in so-called
Newly Industrialized Countries").
Silverstein, supra note 13, at 158-59.
Sherwood, supra note 1, at 494.
56Silverstein, supra note 13, at 165-66.
57 Id.
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intellectual property system.58 Developing countries tend to have
limited resources that they can expend on a governmental body
dedicated to the procurement and protection of intellectual
property.59 Additionally, assuming that the developed countries'
arguments are correct and that strengthened intellectual property
protection will stimulate growth, the developing country will also
need to spend money to develop its infrastructure in order to
support the economic growth predicted by the developed coun-
tries.0
At the very least, the immediate short-term effect of a strength-
ened intellectual property system will be higher royalty payments
from developing countries to developed countries.6' Developing
countries are importers of technology and rely heavily on technolo-
gies created by developed countries. The relative cost of royalty
payments can be further exacerbated in developing countries
because of fluctuations in the foreign currency exchange rates. 2
Moreover, biotechnology is highly patent sensitive, in that a
single patent can dominate a marketed product. As such, patent
protection may result in pricing above competitive levels.63 If the
patented technologies become too expensive, developing countries
may not be able to afford them. However, according to one
commentator, the limited studies performed on this concept suggest
that prices as a whole will not rise at a rate significantly greater
' U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/1, supra note 49, § 72. See also Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily
H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy, 27 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 327, 331 (1994) (noting that developing countries have scarce government resources
and, therefore, resist spending on the enforcement of intellectual property rights); Amy R.
Edge, Preventing Software Piracy Through Regional Trade Agreements: The Mexican
Example, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 175, 190 (1994) (listing types of costs, such as
drafting, economic activity costs, and loss of low cost alternatives to legitimate products).
" Giunta & Shang, supra note 58, at 331.
60 Edge, supra note 58, at 383.
6 See U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/1, supra note 49, § 44 ("[O]ne anticipated consequence of
[developing countries] adopting a stronger [intellectual property] regime would be an
increase in royalty payments to foreign title holders."). See also Giunta & Shang, supra note
58, at 330 (discussing the costs); Braga, supra note 48, at 256 (discussing the initial
consequences of implementing a regime of intellectual property laws).
' Braga, supra note 48, at 256. The fluctuation in the foreign exchange rates, however,
should have only a nominal impact, if any, because there is an equal probability that the
exchange rate fluctuations will benefit and harm both sides of the exchange.
' Sherwood, supra note 1, at 501.
19981
15
McCabe: The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement: Div
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1998
J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 6:41
than the consumer price index.'
While the developed countries believe that pirating provides no
real economic benefit to the pirating country,6" developing coun-
tries tend to believe that pirating intellectual property fuels
economic development.' Indeed, developing countries are expect-
ed to realize an immediate reduction in domestic output and
employment rates as pirate corporations move their operations to
countries with less restrictive intellectual property protection.7
D. A STRONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION REGIME DOES
NOT PROMOTE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' AGRICULTURAL BASE
Two main objectives of the developing countries in the Uruguay
Round were: (1) to obtain access for their agricultural goods in the
markets of the developed countries; and (2) to obtain access for
their textiles and apparel goods in those same markets.68 In light
of these goals, one of the arguments that the developing countries
have raised against the granting of patents for plants is the concern
that public access to the genetic resource of indigenous plant life
"See Sherwood, supra note 1, at 498-500 (citing Italy as a model, the commentator noted
that prices for pharmaceutical products did not increase at a rate greater than the consumer
price index over a ten year period after restrictions on pharmaceutical patents were lifted).
"See J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay Round: Competitive
Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 174 (1993) (noting the possible existence of a
consensus, which indicates that industrialized societies are better off with established
intellectual property regimes than without them).
"See Ritchie et al., supra note 49, at 437 (noting that expanded protection of intellectual
property rights for transnational corporations operating in developing countries discourages
innovation and economic development in those countries). See also Stephan Kirchanski,
Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing Countries: U.S. Efforts to Enforce Pharmaceu-
tical Patents in Thailand, 16 LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 569, 577 (1994) ("This inexpensive
use of technology stimulates the local economy and provides additional profits . . ").
However, one commentator has suggested that pirates may not provide as large a benefit
as some believe because pirates often enter into price-fixing arrangements amongst
themselves, producing goods with prices higher than would be expected for such pirated
imitation products. Sherwood, supra note 1, at 500.
67U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE1, supra note 49, § 7. See also Stamm, supra note 49, at 690
("Naturally trade in pirated goods is economically attractive to many so-called developing
countries and has advantages.").
"Judith H. Bello & Mary E. Footer, Symposium: Uruguay Round - GATT/WTO, 29
INT'L LAW. 335, 337 (1995).
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would be limited by such patent protection.69 A similar concern
that developing countries have regarding patent protection for plant
varieties and biologically engineered organisms is that the prices
for this subject matter will rise once it becomes patentable.7 °
It has been suggested that "the value of a patent system to
developing countries remains controversial, and single developing
countries could suffer hardship because of a growing dependence on
foreign patents with few countervailing benefits."71 Indeed, it is
well recognized that the TRIPS Agreement will impact each
developing and less developed country differently.72
V. How DEVELOPED COUNTRIES CAN ADDRESS THE CONCERNS
OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Several commentators have noted that the TRIPS Agreement
fails to adequately protect nontraditional subject matters such as
biotechnology and computers.73 Transnational corporations are
lobbying for the deletion of the restrictive language of Article 27
from the TRIPS Agreement. 74  Likewise, the United States is
expected to begin lobbying for the deletion of the restrictive
SSX.K. Verma, Trips and Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries, 17 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 281, 286 (1995).
70 U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/1, supra note 49, § 117. But see Sherwood, supra note 1, at
498 ("When a patent law changes so that subject matter previously excluded from patent
protection becomes patentable, the prices of the products already in the market will not
change as a result of the newly introduced patent protection. Nor will competing imitation
products disappear from the market or change their prices.").
7' Reichman, supra note 2, at 354 (citing Oddi, supra note 52). See also Arvind
Subramanian, The International Economics of Intellectual Property Right Protection: A
Welfare-Theoretic Trade Policy Analysis, 19 WORLD DEV. 945, 947-52 (1991) (noting that the
small country might derive very few dynamic benefits from higher levels of intellectual
property protection).
12 U.N. Doc. UNCTADITE/1, supra note 49, § 10.
" Reichman, supra note 2, at 358. See also Lisa B. Martin & Susan L. Amster,
International Intellectual Property Protections in the New GATT Accord, 6 No. 2 J. PROP.
RIGHTS 9, 12 (1994) (detailing the concerns of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
that a serious flaw in the TRIPS Agreement is that it removes many biotechnical products
from the umbrella of international protection by failing to address the issue of the
patentability of plants and animals).
"' See Chakrit Ridmontri, Patenting of Modified Life Forms: EU's Plan Faces Opposition:
Biodiversity Backers Set to Discuss Impact, BANGKOK POST, Nov. 28, 1997, at 1, available in
1997 WL 14431969 (reporting the gathering of forty biodiversity advocates to discuss
opposition to the European Union's move to legalize the patenting of living organisms).
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language of Article 27.71 In addition to deleting the restrictive
language, the developed countries have alternative avenues which
may simultaneously address both the developing and developed
countries' concerns.
A. UPOV CONVENTION
The TRIPS Agreement provides that if the contracting state
excludes patent protection for plants from its domestic patent laws,
the contracting state must protect plant varieties under a sui
generis legal regime.76 Several commentators have suggested that
an appropriate sui generis legal regime could be based on the
International Convention for the Protection of New Plant Varieties
(UPOV Convention).7
The UPOV Convention was created in 1961 in response to
complaints regarding the difficulty of obtaining patent protection
for cultivated plants.7' The UPOV Convention established plant
breeders' rights that provide protection for new plant varieties that
are clearly distinguishable by one or more important characteristic,
homogeneous in their sexual reproduction or vegetative propaga-
tion, and stable in their essential characteristics. 79 Although the
UPOV Convention provides substantial protection for plant
7" According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, "biotechnology is a
key area of omission from the TRIPs Agreement's patent obligations [and] U.S. negotiators
should strive to remedy this situation." WTO Implementation Report: Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights (visited Oct. 14, 1998) <httpi/www.ustr.gov/reports/wto/
intellectual-property.html>.
76 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(3)(b).
7 International Convention for the Protection of New Plant Varieties, Dec. 2, 1961,
revised by 33 U.S.T. 2703 (1978) reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY L. 53 (Marshall A. Leaffer ed., 1990) [hereinafter UPOV Convention]. See also
Reichman, supra note 2, at 358-59 (discussing TRIPS and UPOV); David S. Tillford, Saving
the Blue Prints: The International Regime for Plant Resources, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
373, 406-7 (1998) (providing a general description of the UPOV Convention and its 1991
Amendment); Naomi Rohy-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriateness of the
Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 919, 940 (1996) ("The most well known existing sui generis system for plants is the [UPOV
convention].").
7 UPOV Convention, supra note 77. See also Bosselmann, supra note 3, at 123 ("The
difficulties of obtaining patent protection for the cultivation of plants ... led eventually to
the adoption of [UPOV].").
" UPOV Convention, supra note 77, art. 6.
[Vol. 6:41
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varieties, the scope of its protection is limited. For example, the
UPOV Convention does not protect plant parts or plant products.
The scope of protection under the UPOV Convention is further
limited because of so-called farmer's rights, which allow farmers to
reuse the seed from the crops they grow in subsequent seasons.8 0
Additionally, the UPOV Convention does not provide a doctrine of
equivalence-like protection for plants, and it provides no protection
against the use of the protected variety in the making of another
plant variety.8
The 1991 revision of the UPOV Convention (1991 UPOV
Convention) altered the standard of protection from a modified
copyright model to a modified patent model.8 2 It has been sug-
gested that the scope of protection provided by the 1991 UPOV
Convention is best suited toward "traditional 'field' research based
on selecting the best and strongest plant and animals for breeding,
cross-breeding and hybridization."83 The 1991 UPOV Convention
addresses at least some of the nontraditional methodologies for
producing new plant varieties.' 4 However, neither convention
provides the level of protection provided by a patent system.85 A
major concern of the developing countries is the protection of their
' See Bosselmann, supra note 3, at 123-25 (citing GOLLINS ET AL., BIOTECHNOLOGY
PROSPECTING (1993)) ("T]he legislative presumption is that farmer's rights are not allowed
without the express authorization of the breeder . . ").
"' UPOV Convention, supra note 77, art. 15(iii). See also Bai, supra note 3, at 144
(stating that there is no protection under a doctrine of equivalence theory for plant varieties).
2 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, opened for
signature Mar. 19, 1991, reprinted in 3 EUR. PAT. HANDBOOK (MB) ch. 90 [hereinafter 1991
UPOV Convention]. See also Reichman, supra note 2, at 359 (stating that the 1991 revision
elevated UPOV Convention "standards of protection to a modified patent model"); Bai, supra
note 3, at 144 (stating that the 1991 UPOV Convention "seems to offer patent-like protection
to plant varieties").
' Sherwood, supra note 1, at 520. But see 1991 UPOV Convention, supra note 82
(providing stronger protection for genetically modified plants).
8' Scalise & Nugent, supra note 8, at 108-9. See also Bosselmann, supra note 3, at 125
(citing Natalie M. Derzko, Plant Breeders Rights in Canada and Abroad: What Are These
Rights and How Much Must Society Pay for Them?, 39 MCGILL L.J. 144, 167 (1992)) (stating
that, under the 1991 UPOV revision, the legislative presumption was that farmers must
obtain express authorization from plant breeders to take seeds from a harvested crop to grow
the next crop).
85 Bai, supra note 3, at 148.
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agricultural economies." Therefore, they are generally reluctant
to provide patent protection for plants and plant parts.87 The
TRIPS Agreement, however, provides that, at the very least, the
contracting states must provide a sui generis form of protection for
plant varieties. Although the 1991 UPOV Convention does not
provide the level of protection that patents do, it may provide a
common platform acceptable to both sides of this issue.
B. PRICE CONTROLS
If one concern of developing countries is the higher prices
associated with patented subject matter, one course of action would
be to install price control mechanisms, rather than imposing
outright bans on patent protection. Through price controls, the
developing countries could ensure that the patented technologies
are not priced at unreasonable levels. If the patentee was able to
realize a reasonable return on his investment, technology transfer
to developing countries would not be inhibited.
Price controls which are unreasonably restrictive, however, will
only act to restrain the importation of patented technologies into
the developing country.' Without an adequate return on invest-
ment, companies will not transfer their latest technologies to a
developing country."s Given the history of price controls, it is
unlikely that any price control mechanism would provide the
' See supra Part IV.D (discussing the concern of developing countries with respect to
their agricultural base).
87 Id.
" See, e.g., Ileana Dominguez-Urban, Harmonization in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical
Research and Human Rights: The Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 245, 247
n.8 (1997) (suggesting that patent hostility and price controls may "decrease drug availability
or cause pharmaceutical companies to withdraw from some particular markets or to engage
in less innovative research"). Another commentator has suggested that the existence of price
control systems in Europe may be one reason why there is less biotechnology innovation in
Europe. Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs & The Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need for Reform,
17 AM. J.L. & MED. 363, 407 (1991).
9 See supra Part II.A. (discussing the incentives provided to investors by intellectual
property protection). Indeed, one critic commenting on India, has suggested that the phasing
out of price controls "would provide an incentive structure necessary to encourage Indian
pharmaceutical corporations to increase their research and development expenditures."
Suresh Koshy, The Effect of TRIPS on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical Industry
Perspective, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 4, 55 (1995).
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patentee with a sufficient return on his investment. The net effect
would be an unwillingness on the part of corporations from
developed countries to operate in such markets. Indeed, it would
be expected that the developed countries would vigorously oppose
price control mechanisms because of the subjective nature of
defining what is a "reasonable" price.9" Therefore, it is unlikely
that the developed countries would find acceptable any proposal
including price control mechanisms.
C. COMPULSORY LICENSING
Although the TRIPS Agreement permits compulsory licensing of
patents, it has placed severe restrictions on the use of such
licenses.9' Some of these restrictions could be relaxed as a
concession towards the developing countries in exchange for
enhanced patent protection for biotechnology. However, one of the
developed countries' main stated goals in negotiating the TRIPS
Agreement was to secure a restriction on the application of
compulsory licenses.92 Given the negotiating position of the
developed countries, it is unlikely that they would agree to a
relaxation of the restrictions on compulsory licenses.93
D. WORK REQUIREMENTS
Several developing countries, prior to the TRIPS Agreement,
required that a patented invention had to be manufactured
domestically in order to receive the full scope of patent protection
'o For example, the pharmaceutical industry and other special interest groups, have
always been opposed to price controls and compulsory licensing requirements. See Griffin,
supra note 88, at 397 (noting the general opposition to price controls and drug licensing).
9' TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31. As a general rule, a compulsory license can
only be granted if an attempt has been made to obtain a voluntary license on reasonable
terms and conditions, the patentee obtains adequate remuneration, and the reasonable value
of the invention has been taken into account. Id. In addition, the patentee must be able to
subject the compulsory license to judicial or other independent review. Finally, the laws
must prohibit discrimination in compulsory licensing with respect to a given field of
technology, place of invention, or location of manufacture. Id. See also Otten & Wager,
supra note 12, at 401 (noting the existence of multiple restrictions).
92 Bosselmann, supra note 3, at 146.
93 Id.
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offered by that country.94 If a patented invention was not manu-
factured in the developing country, a third party could petition the
government for a license to manufacture the patented invention in
the developing country. Obviously, these provisions were extremely
unpopular with developed countries. s5
Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, which provides that
"patent rights [shall be] enjoyable ... whether [the] products are
imported or locally produced," has effectively banned work require-
ments.96 From the developed country's perspective, work require-
ments were highly contentious, and therefore, they would not
accept any modification to Article 27 that provided for work
requirements.
E. PURSUIT OF ADDITIONAL UNILATERAL, BILATERAL, OR
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
The TRIPS Agreement was implemented to establish a minimum
standard for the protection of intellectual property.97 Member
countries may, however, provide more extensive protection for
intellectual property than that provided for in the TRIPS Agree-
ment.9" Member countries may also belong to international
agreements that promote stronger intellectual property protection,
for example the European Community, the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA),99 and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO).'00
If the United States is unable to obtain adequate concessions
from the TRIPS Council, it could lobby each of the respective
' Countries that provided for work requirements prior to the TRIPS Agreement include
Brazil and India. See also John Richards, Recent Patent Law Developments in Asia, 7
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 599, 603 (1997) (explaining the Turkish system).
" The main reason such requirements are unpopular, especially within the biotechnology
industry, is that companies from developed countries rarely manufacture the patented
invention in a developing country. If such requirements were in place, a given company
would be forced to set up a manufacturing facility in every country having such requirements
in order to maintain patent rights. Such action would be too burdensome for any company.
" TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(1).
97 Id.
9 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
10D Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (1972).
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multilateral and bilateral organizations to alter their positions on
the patentability of biotechnology. Alternatively, the United States
could pursue new unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral agreements
that provide more robust protection for biotechnology. One reason
the TRIPS Agreement was enacted, however, was in recognition of
the difficulty of negotiating worldwide patent protection through
unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral agreements. 1 1
F. AMEND OR MODIFY THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Article 71 of the TRIPS Agreement authorizes the TRIPS
Council, established in Article 68, "to undertake reviews in the
light of any relevant new developments which might warrant
modifications or amendment of this Agreement."102 Although the
TRIPS Council must forward amendments to the TRIPS Agreement
to the Ministerial Conference of the WTO for consideration, it
appears that the TRIPS Council has the authority to make
modifications to the TRIPS Agreement without forwarding such
modifications to the full Ministerial Conference of the WTO. 1
3
If the United States does not think that it will receive adequate
consideration for an amendment to Article 27 before a Ministerial
Conference, the United States may wish to pursue a modification.
This avenue probably represents the United States' best option for
obtaining the desired changes to Article 27.
An example of such a modification can be ascertained by an
interpretation of the somewhat ambiguous language of Article 27.
For example, Article 27(3) provides that Member countries may
exclude from patentability "plants and animals."0 4 An argument
could be made, and further strengthened by a letter of interpreta-
101 Paul Katzenberger & Annette Kur, TRIPS and Intellectual Property, in FROM GATT
TO TRIPs - THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 1-7 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996).
'o' TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 68, 71(1).
o Formal amendments (but not necessarily modifications) appear to require a consensus
proposal from the TRIPS Council for action before a Ministerial Conference. TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 1, art. 71(2); WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. X(2), (3), (6). See
also Reichman, supra note 2, at 384 (noting that the TRIPS Council, under the statute, may
review modifications and amendments and in this capacity, may substitute for developed
countries trade representatives).
'04 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(3).
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tion from the TRIPS Council, that the phrase "plants and animals,"
as used in Article 27(3), refers only to plants and animals made
through traditional breeding techniques. It appears that Article
27(3) provides that "non-biological and microbiological processes"
for the production of plants and animals may not be excluded from
patentability. 5 "[Bliological processes for the production of
plants or animals," however, may be excluded from patentabili-
ty. 1
06
If Article 27(3) does not exclude "non-biological and microbiologi-
cal processes" for the production of plants or animals from patent-
ability, then it would appear that Article 27(3) would require the
extension of patent protection to the plants or animals made by
such processes. If the United States were able to persuade the
TRIPS Council to issue such a statement of interpretation, the
TRIPS Council would not have to forward such a statement to a
Ministerial Conference for resolution because it would only be a
modification, if anything, of the TRIPS Agreement.0 7 As the
TRIPS Council is smaller than the Ministerial Conference, the
United States should be able to successfully lobby for such a
modification, especially if the United States were able to obtain the
support of Japan and the European Union.
VI. RAMIFICATIONS OF INADEQUATE PATENT PROTECTION
FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Patent protection acts as a stimulus for investment, not necessar-
ily because it offers an expectation of increased profits, but rather
because it offers a mechanism to exclude competitors from copying
the subject invention.0 8 It has been argued that inadequate
106 Id.
'
0
6 Id.
101 Article 71(2) provides that amendments to the TRIPS Agreement need to be referred
to a Ministerial Conference. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 71(2). Article 71 places
no special restriction on modifications. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 71. Therefore,
it would appear that the TRIPS Council would be able to modify the TRIPS Agreement
without referring the modification to a Ministerial Conference for consideration. See supra
note 103 and accompanying text (discussing the inference that a modification, unlike an
amendment, may not have to be referred for consideration).
1"8 Sherwood, supra note 1, at 500.
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intellectual property protection undermines free trade. °9
In order for developing countries to fully benefit from a stronger
intellectual property protection regime, corporations in developed
countries will have to either increase their direct investments in
developing countries or license their technologies to the developing
countries."0 Even under the best of circumstances, however,
certain individual countries will be worse off after the implementa-
tion of a stronger intellectual property protection regime than
others."' Specifically, the least industrialized countries have the
most to gain from strengthening their intellectual property
protection."2  These countries generally lack the industrial
capacity to pirate the intellectual property of others."' Addition-
ally, these countries require large infusions of capital investment
in order to develop an effective technological base.""
One of the ways for the least developed countries to obtain
capital investment is to modify their intellectual property protec-
tion and their economies." 5 By strengthening their intellectual
property protection and reforming their economies to a market-
based economy with a free and open trade system, these countries
will encourage outside capital investment. Only through indige-
nous research and development will developing countries achieve
real growth and development of their economies." 6 Indigenous
research and development, such as external capital investments,
will only occur once appropriate intellectual property protection
exists.
17
10 Giunta & Shang, supra note 58, at 332 (citing Intellectual Property and Trade:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 51-53 (1986) (statement of Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative for Trade Policy and Analysis, Harvey E. Bale, Jr.)).
no Reichman, supra note 2, at 354.
... See Reichman, supra note 2, at 354 (discussing hardships faced by some developing
companies as a result of reliance on foreign patents).
112 Sherwood, supra note 1, at 493.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 494.
11' Id. at 508 ("[A] country which adopts a robust [intellectual property] system will be
able to encourage optimum risk capital activity.").
116 EDWARD SLAvKO YAMBRUSIC, TRADE-BASED APPROACHES TO THE PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 (1992).
117 However, it has been suggested that there is little conclusive evidence that
strengthened intellectual property protection would expand the transfer of technology to
developing countries. U.N. Doc. UNCTADITE/1, supra note 49, § 61.
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In many developing countries, agriculture is an important
component of the economy." 8 It has been reported that biotech-
nology has played, and will continue to play, an important role in
the development of new higher-yielding and pathogen resistant
forms of commercial food crops." 9  As the world's population
continues to grow, it will be necessary to expand the productivity
and yield of traditional farming techniques. 2 ' Genetically modi-
fied crop species are expected to represent the future in the growth
of farming productivity and crop yields.' 2 '
Companies will likely refrain from commercializing genetically
engineered crops in countries that lack strong patent protec-
tion."'22 Indeed, companies may not be willing to either sell or
license their patented technologies in markets that lack adequate
patent protection. 2 ' If the developing countries are refused
18 Sherwood, supra note 1, at 505, 520.
119 Bosselmann, supra note 3, at 118. Indeed, it has been estimated that over fifty
percent of the increase in the yield of food crops has been the result of genetic manipulation.
Id. at 115 (citing Eric Christensen, Genetic Arc: A Proposal to Preserve Genetic Diversity for
Future Generations, 40 STAN. L. REV. 279, 288 (1987)).
For example, Agracetus, a biotechnology company, has received a patent in the U.S. for
genetically engineered cotton. Ann Thayer, Scope of Agricultural Biotechnology Patents
Sparks Debate, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Aug. 21, 1995, at 12-13; Seth Shulman,
Patent Medicine, TECH. REV. NovlDec. 1995, at 28, 31.
Other genetically modified crops include Monsanto's Roundup Ready Soybean and
Novartis' herbicide- and pest-resistant Maximizer maize. Thomas P. Redick et al., Private
Legal Mechanisms for Regulating the Risks of Genetically Modified Organisms: An
Alternative Path within the Biosaftey Protocol, 4 ENvTL. LAW. 1, 14 (1997) (citing Diane
Montague, Genetic Engineering and Food Safety, MILLING & BAKING NEWS, Feb. 11, 1997,
at 26-8; Emma Johnson, Ciba Faces a Maize of Committees in Europe, 14 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1068 (1996)).
12 John H. Barton, Biotechnology, the Environment, and International Agricultural Trade,
9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 95, 98-99 (1996).
121 See Barton, supra note 120, at 98-9 (discussing the advantages of technically
engineered agriculture for increasing yield and improving quality).
1 Sherwood, supra note 1, at 506. One commentator has suggested that European
biotechnology companies are considering relocating their operations to the United States
because of the United States' more expansive protection of biotechnology. Bosselmann, supra
note 3, at 128. See also Edge, supra note 58, at 191 ("[Without intellectual property laws
to protect their investment, foreign producers will be reluctant to ship their products into the
developing country or to invest in the local economy.").
One critic, however, has suggested that "[tihe frantic cry for patent protection in
agriculture is really a ruse for control of biological resources in agriculture." SHIVA, supra
note 1, at 54.
1 Sherwood, supra note 1, at 503.
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access to the latest patented, biogenetically engineered plants and
animals, the developing countries will be precluded from realizing
increases in farming productivity and crop yields. The net effect
would be that the countries that are the most dependent on their
agricultural base would be unable to take advantage of many of the
breakthroughs that are happening today and that are anticipated
to occur over the next decade. Therefore, it is in the developing
countries' best interests to adopt the developed countries viewpoint
toward intellectual property protection. In doing so, they will
ensure that they will be able to benefit from the expanding
breakthroughs that biotechnology will continue to offer in the
future.
VII. CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that "[aifter the Uruguay Round goes into
effect, the terms of protection for biotechnology patents should be
a major focus of the United States policy."'24 The United States
and the United States biotechnology industry should lobby
extensively for an amendment or modification to Article 27 that
would mandate the recognition of all biotechnological inventions as
patentable subject matter. Not only would such an amendment or
modification be vitally important to sustaining the biotechnology
revolution that the United States has experienced in the last
decade, but such an amendment or modification also would help the
long-term economic and social growth of the developing countries.
However, given the current political split between the developed
and developing countries, no change in the existing system is
entirely possible. 125 In the end, any amendment or modification,
if it is to succeed, must be responsive to the different economic and
social realties of each country.
26
12 Mossinghoff Statement, supra note 21, at 5.
12 See Bosselmann, supra note 3, at 141 (discussing the various possible results on
intellectual property flowing from the political split between the developed and developing
countries).
2 Silverstein, supra note 13, at 156.
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